

AMENDMENT TO RULES COMM. PRINT 118–10
OFFERED BY MR. BARR OF KENTUCKY

At the end of subtitle A of title XVIII, add the following:

1 **SEC. __. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR COUN-**
2 **TERING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA**
3 **MALIGN INFLUENCE FUND.**

4 (a) COUNTERING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
5 CHINA MALIGN INFLUENCE FUND.—

6 (1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be
7 appropriated \$400,000,000 for each of fiscal years
8 2024 through 2028 for the Countering the People’s
9 Republic of China Malign Influence Fund to counter
10 the malign influence of the Chinese Communist
11 Party and the Government of the People’s Republic
12 of China and entities acting on their behalf globally.

13 (2) AVAILABILITY; AMOUNTS IN ADDITION TO
14 OTHER AMOUNTS.—Amounts appropriated pursuant
15 to the authorization of appropriations under para-
16 graph (1)—

17 (A) are authorized to remain available
18 until expended; and

1 (B) shall be in addition to amounts other-
2 wise authorized to be appropriated for the pur-
3 poses described in paragraph (1).

4 (b) CONSULTATION REQUIRED.—The obligation of
5 funds appropriated pursuant to the authorization of ap-
6 propriations under subsection (a) or otherwise made avail-
7 able for the purposes described in subsection (a)(1) shall
8 be subject to prior consultation with, and consistent with
9 section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
10 U.S.C. 2394–1), the regular notification procedures of—

11 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
12 the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

13 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
14 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
15 resentatives.

16 (c) POLICY GUIDANCE, COORDINATION, AND AP-
17 PROVAL.—

18 (1) COORDINATOR.—The Secretary of State
19 shall designate an existing senior official of the De-
20 partment of State to provide policy guidance, coordi-
21 nation, and approval for the obligation of funds ap-
22 propriated pursuant to the authorization of appro-
23 priations under subsection (a).

24 (2) ASSISTANT COORDINATOR.—The Adminis-
25 trator of the United States Agency for International

1 Development shall designate an existing senior offi-
2 cial of the United States Agency for International
3 Development to assist and consult with the senior
4 official of the Department of State designated pur-
5 suant to paragraph (1).

6 (3) DUTIES.—The senior official of the Depart-
7 ment of State designated pursuant to paragraph (1)
8 shall be responsible for—

9 (A) on an annual basis, the identification
10 of specific strategic priorities for using funds
11 appropriated pursuant to the authorization of
12 appropriations under subsection (a), such as ge-
13 ographic areas of focus or functional categories
14 of programming that funds are to be con-
15 centrated within, consistent with the national
16 interests of the United States and the purposes
17 of this section;

18 (B) the coordination and approval of all
19 programming conducted using such funds,
20 based on an assessment that such programming
21 directly counters the malign influence of the
22 Chinese Communist Party or the Government
23 of the People’s Republic of China, including
24 specific activities or policies advanced by the
25 Chinese Communist Party or the Government

1 of the People’s Republic of China and entities
2 acting on their behalf globally, pursuant to the
3 strategic objectives of the United States, as es-
4 tablished in the 2017 National Security Strat-
5 egy, the 2018 National Defense Strategy, and
6 other relevant national and regional strategies
7 as appropriate;

8 (C) ensuring that all programming ap-
9 proved bears a sufficiently direct nexus to such
10 activities of the Chinese Communist Party or
11 the Government of the People’s Republic of
12 China described in subsection (d) and adheres
13 to the requirements outlined in subsection (e);
14 and

15 (D) conducting oversight, monitoring, and
16 evaluation of the effectiveness of all program-
17 ming conducted using such funds to ensure that
18 it advances United States interests and de-
19 grades the ability of the Chinese Communist
20 Party or the Government of the People’s Re-
21 public of China, to advance activities that align
22 with subsection (d) of this section.

23 (4) INTERAGENCY COORDINATION.—The senior
24 official of the Department of State designated pur-
25 suant to paragraph (1) shall, in coordinating and

1 approving programming pursuant to paragraph (2),
2 seek—

3 (A) to conduct appropriate interagency
4 consultation; and

5 (B) to ensure, to the maximum extent
6 practicable, that all approved programming
7 functions in concert with other Federal activi-
8 ties to counter the malign influence of the Chi-
9 nese Communist Party or the Government of
10 the People’s Republic of China.

11 (d) MALIGN INFLUENCE.—In this section, the term
12 “malign influence”, with respect to the Chinese Com-
13 munist Party or the Government of the People’s Republic
14 of China, shall be construed to include acts conducted by
15 the Chinese Communist Party or the Government of the
16 People’s Republic of China, or entities acting on their be-
17 half that—

18 (1) undermine a free and open international
19 order;

20 (2) advance an alternative, repressive inter-
21 national order that bolsters the Chinese Communist
22 Party’s or the Government of the People’s Republic
23 of China’s hegemonic ambitions and is characterized
24 by coercion and dependency;

1 (3) undermine the national security or sov-
2 ereignty of the United States or other countries; or

3 (4) undermine the economic security of the
4 United States or other countries, including by pro-
5 moting corruption and advancing coercive economic
6 practices.

7 (e) COUNTERING MALIGN INFLUENCE.—In this sec-
8 tion, countering malign influence through the use of funds
9 appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropria-
10 tions under subsection (a) shall include efforts—

11 (1) to promote transparency and accountability,
12 and reduce corruption, including in governance
13 structures targeted by the malign influence of the
14 Chinese Communist Party or the Government of the
15 People’s Republic of China;

16 (2) to support civil society and independent
17 media to raise awareness of and increase trans-
18 parency regarding the negative impact of activities
19 related to the Belt and Road Initiative, associated
20 initiatives, other economic initiatives with strategic
21 or political purposes, and coercive economic prac-
22 tices;

23 (3) to counter transnational criminal networks
24 that benefit, or benefit from, the malign influence of

1 the Chinese Communist Party or the Government of
2 the People's Republic of China;

3 (4) to encourage economic development struc-
4 tures that help protect against predatory lending
5 schemes, including support for market-based alter-
6 natives in key economic sectors, such as digital econ-
7 omy, energy, and infrastructure;

8 (5) to counter activities that provide undue in-
9 fluence to the security forces of the People's Repub-
10 lic of China;

11 (6) to expose misinformation and
12 disinformation of the Chinese Communist Party's or
13 the Government of the People's Republic of China's
14 propaganda, including through programs carried out
15 by the Global Engagement Center; and

16 (7) to counter efforts by the Chinese Com-
17 munist Party or the Government of the People's Re-
18 public of China to legitimize or promote authori-
19 tarian ideology and governance models.

20 (f) ANNUAL SUMMARY.—Not later than September
21 30, 2024, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the senior
22 official of the Department of State designated pursuant
23 to subsection (c)(1) shall submit to the congressional com-
24 mittees specified in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection

1 (b), a summary identifying each activity or program ap-
2 proved pursuant to subsection (c), and shall include—

3 (1) for each program or activity, an identifica-
4 tion of the country or regional location of the pro-
5 gram or activity;

6 (2) for each program or activity, whether the
7 program or activity was ongoing prior to receiving
8 support from funds from the Countering People's
9 Republic of China Malign Influence Fund, or any
10 predecessor resource intended for the same or sub-
11 stantially similar purpose;

12 (3) for each program or activity, an identifica-
13 tion of the acts described in subsection (d) that such
14 program or activity is intended to counter; and

15 (4) a table identifying the respective allocation
16 of all programs or activities approved during that
17 fiscal year across accounts and regional or functional
18 bureaus.

